Nigeria needs systems audit before hybrid excise stamp rollout

Nigeria’s new excise stamp regime should be judged on whether it closes real enforcement gaps, not simply on whether it adds another layer of authentication. The Nigeria Customs Service Excise Stamp Regulations, 2026 set up a framework for physical or electronic authentication marks and monitoring of excisable products. The stated goals are traceability, accountability, product authenticity, digital monitoring and curbing illicit trade.

Those goals are sound. The risk is duplication. MAN has argued that the Customs Service’s B’Odogwu Automated Excise Register System and the Federal Inland Revenue Service’s e-invoicing platform already provide important digital records of excise operations, production and sales. Its objection is that another compliance layer could repeat functions government has already funded.

What the existing systems can do

The existence of B’Odogwu and e-invoicing does not prove they can perform every function of a product-level authentication system. E-invoicing serves a different immediate purpose from verifying an individual product in a shop or along a distribution route. An excise register may provide useful production data without giving consumers or enforcement officers an easy way to check the authenticity of a specific item.

That distinction matters. It would be premature to call the stamp regime technically redundant without comparing actual capabilities. It is equally premature for government to assume a new physical and digital layer is necessary without showing which existing functions are inadequate.

Start with a systems audit

Authorities should begin with a systems audit. What data does B’Odogwu already capture? What information is available through e-invoicing? Can production volumes, excise obligations and product movements be reconciled across the platforms? Where are the gaps in real-time monitoring? How often do those gaps lead to lost revenue or illicit goods? What would it cost to close them through integration rather than another standalone arrangement?

A well-designed digital system should reduce duplication, automate routine reporting, improve information quality and help enforcement agencies focus on high-risk transactions. Where agencies collect similar data but cannot exchange it, the problem may be institutional interoperability, not the absence of another platform. Adding a system without solving that could force businesses to enter similar information repeatedly while agencies run separate databases.

The physical and digital trade-off

A physical mark may provide visible authentication, but it can be falsified, removed, copied or improperly reused if security and verification are weak. Digital identifiers are not immune: poorly secured databases, cloned codes, compromised devices and weak access controls can undermine a digital-only solution. No technology is automatically effective because it is physical or digital.

The right test is measurable: authentication accuracy, resistance to fraud, ease of verification, implementation cost, production-line speed, data security, interoperability and the ability to detect illicit supply chains. A hybrid system may be justified where a physical security feature has a demonstrable advantage. But where a digital identifier linked to a secure, interoperable database can deliver the same result at lower cost, requiring a physical stamp may amount to unnecessary friction.

For manufacturers and consumers, the policy should not become another cost layer without stronger enforcement. Government should prove the gaps, compare the models and integrate before imposing a mandatory system across relevant product categories.